Watch Frontline’s “The Anthrax Files”/ PBS
See Part I of The Anthrax Files. This terribly important 1 hour documentary uncovered new evidence in the case. Additional videos related to the case are accessible at the site. Enjoy.
See Part I of The Anthrax Files. This terribly important 1 hour documentary uncovered new evidence in the case. Additional videos related to the case are accessible at the site. Enjoy.
My thoughts on handling Ebola, which garnered so much interest that I have expanded the original ideas, including updates and links: 1. Personal Protective Equipment Even the best containment gear, combined with a diluted bleach solution to spray down workers as layers are removed, and a buddy system that requires another healthcare professional to watch…
Below is my recent letter to the Chair of the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues, preceding the Commission’s meeting last week. The Commission’s blog mentions some of what was discussed. The Commission will report its views to the DHHS Secretary by year’s end. Meryl Nass, MD Board Certified in Internal Medicine Mount…
The Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREPA), passed by the United States Congress and signed into law in December, 2005, is a controversial tort liability shield intended to protect vaccine manufacturers from financial risk in the event of a declared public health emergency. The Act does not specify any criteria for determining the existence…
In a nutshell: Yesterday CDC asked its advisory committee to “recommend” the Comirnaty vaccine for 16 and 17 year olds. And it agreed, unanimously. Or pusillanimously. The vote may seem silly or superfluous, because it had already been recommended for this age group as an EUA. But this vote was anything but superfluous. This seemingly…
USA Today: The FBI never examined anthrax samples from the 2001 contamination event at (Ivins’) biodefense lab, which he allegedly covered up after the anthrax mailings. Yet these samples should have been the first to examine once Ivins was deemed a suspect.
The following paper was written by CDC scientists in 1999. J Infect Dis. 1999 Feb;179 Suppl 1:S92-7. Ebola Hemorrhagic Fever, Kikwit, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1995: risk factors for patients without a reported exposure. Roels TH1, Bloom AS, Buffington J, Muhungu GL, Mac Kenzie WR, Khan AS, Ndambi R, Noah DL, Rolka HR, Peters CJ, Ksiazek TG. Author information Abstract In 1995, 316 people became…
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The anthrax attack on the Capitol Hill complex was an attack on the core of American democracy. The investigation is not finished until
1) the silicon tin signature can be replicated in conditions approximating those of whoever sent it
2) the entire lineage of every flask of Ames anthrax DNA in the world is traced back to the cow or as closely as possible.
Interesting timing for yesterday's FBI Dog and Pony Show.
If Ivins had spent months growing anthrax in plates in trash bags or other odd places, then he would have tracked the spores to his car and home. But the FBI found none.
This is particularly true if Ivins handled them outside the BSL3 and did not shower after handling them.
Old Atlantic Lighthouse wrote: "If Ivins had spent months growing anthrax in plates in trash bags or other odd places, then he would have tracked the spores to his car and home. But the FBI found none.
"This is particularly true if Ivins handled them outside the BSL3 and did not shower after handling them."
Ivins grew the spores in the autoclave bags in his BSL-3 lab, refined them there, and prepared the letters there. And, he showed after handling them.
So, you seem to agree that Ivins had the capability.
It's known that Ivins allowed full autoclave bags to accumulate in his lab for weeks. No one would know if Ivins removed the anthrax from the plates and put empty plates back into the bags.
Besides, Ivins was accustomed to handling plates with anthrax in them. He did it every day. The only time there was a risk of spores going all over the place would be when he scraped the DRY spores out of the drying dish and into the letters. And, he would have done that task inside of a biosafety cabinet in his BSL-3 lab.
He was careful, but he still tracked spores into his office and into the locker room and elsewhere. He TWICE did unauthorized cleanups to get rid of the evidence. Remember?
He wouldn't have tracked the spores home because he showered and disposed of his lab clothes after loading the letters with anthrax. And, since he didn't want fingerprints on the letters, he probably carried them around in a Ziplock bag, and wiped down the outside of the bag with bleach.
AFTER the attacks, Ivins handled the Daschle letter in his BSL-3 lab in his biosafety cabinet. So, no one would be able to tell if the spores were there from when he prepared the letters prior to mailing them or from when he handled the Daschle letter to test the spore concentration.
Ed